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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE - ADVERTISEMENT AN-
NOUNCING FREE EXCHANGE OF 1955 CAR IF 1954 MODEL WAS
PURCHASED HELD AN OFFER.-Plaintiff brought an action for specific
performance against defendant car-dealer who advertised by news-
paper that anyone who bought a new 1954 Ford from him would be
entitled to exchange it, without extra charge, for a new 1955 model
when these appeared on the market.' In response to the advertise-
ment plaintiff bought a new 1954 Ford but defendant contended that
plaintiff was not entitled to the 1955 model since the advertisement
was merely an invitation to bargain and the 1955 deal was not in-
cluded in his purchase-sale contract. The Court held that the ad-
vertisement constituted an offer which ripened into a contract when
plaintiff purchased the 1954 Ford. Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co.,
85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
The principle that an advertisement may constitute a general
offer, acceptance of which will result in a contract, has generally been
applied in instances where the advertiser offered a reward for the
furnishing of certain information. 2 The characteristics of such an-
nouncements require that they be addressed to the general public and
it is well settled that they can be withdrawn only in the same manner.3
Advertisements relating to the sale of merchandise, however, have
been more frequently construed as invitations to make offers.4 The
only general test which can be applied, as a guide in determining the
status of an advertisement, is an inquiry whether the facts show that
some performance was promised in positive terms in return for some-
thing requested.5
It is often difficult to distinguish between offers and negotiations
preliminary thereto. 6 Since it is common business psychology to in-
' In Louisiana, there is a statutory right to bring an action for specific
performance of a contract to sell personal property. LA. Crv. CODE ANN.
art. 2462 (West 1952); see also Jackson, Specific Performance of Contracts
in Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REv. 401, 418 (1950). ". . . [T]he tendency of the
civil law is to hold the defendant responsible for the very act contracted for
and to give the plaintiff exactly what he would have received had not the
defendant defaulted. . . ." Ibid.
2 Salisbury v. Credit Service, Inc., 39 Del. (39 W.W. Harr.) 377, 199 At.
674, 681-82 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (dictum). See, e.g., Shuey v. United States, 92
U.S. 73 (1875) (for apprehension of criminal) ; Pierson v. Morch, 82 N.Y. 503
(1880) (return of lost property).
3 See Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875) ; Sullivan v. Phillips, 178
Ind. 164, 98 N.E. 868 (1912); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 43 (1932).
4 Salisbury v. Credit Service, Inc., supra note 2, at 682.
5 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 27 (rev. ed. 1936).
6 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 25, comment a (1932).
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duce the other party to make the definite offer 7 courts have been
reluctant to treat any step in the negotiations as an offer s Accord-
ingly, if the advertising material is in the form of a letter or circular
giving a price list for certain articles it may be treated as an announce-
ment that the advertiser is interested in receiving proposals for sales
on the terms and conditions stated.9 It is a device for calling to the
attention of those in the trade what bargains are available.' 0 Simi-
larly, if goods are listed for sale at a certain price it is not an offer
and no contract is formed upon the purchaser's declaration that he
will take a specified quantity of goods at that price.'I If such an
announcement were treated as an offer, it might subject the adver-
tiser to a crushing burden of liability.1 2 The rare cases which have
held an advertisement for the sale of merchandise to be offers are
those where the wording of the offer was clear, definite and left
nothing open for negotiation.13
In the final analysis, the determination of whether an advertise-
ment will be deemed an offer is a matter of the intention of the offeror
as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
14
Factors which will be considered in determining this intention are:
(1) the definiteness of the terms of the offer,15 (2) the customs and
usages of the business,' 6 (3) and all the surrounding circumstances. 17
In two New York cases involving the question of advertisements
for the sale of merchandise at a stated price the advertisements were
held to be invitations to enter into negotiation.18 In Lovett v.
Frederick Loeser & Co.,19 the court in deciding this point relied
heavily on Georgian Co. v. Bloom 2 0 indicating that it felt such an-
7Ibid.
8 See, e.g., Lonergan v. Scoliick, 129 Cal. App. 2d 179, 276 P.2d 8 (1954);
Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98 Neb. 89, 152 N.W. 310 (1915).
9 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89, 95 N.E. 290
(1911) ; Posposia Coal Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 106 Neb. 4, 182 N.W.
586 (1921); Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, 18 N.W. 172 (1884).
10 Moulton v. Kershaw, supra note 9, at 174-75.
11 See Lovett v. Frederick Loeser & .Co., 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Sjupp. 753
(N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924); Georgian Co. v. Bloom, 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E.
813 (1921); Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 34 Ohio L. Abs. 603, 38 N.E.2d
416 (Ct. App. 1941).
12 WHITNEY, CONTRACTS § 17 (5th ed. 1953).
13 See Seymour v. Armstrong, 62 Kan. 720, 64 Pac. 612 (1901) ; Oliver v.
Henley, 21 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
14 R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1945) (dictum);
J. E. Pinkham Lumber Co. v. C. W. Griffin & Co., 212 Ala 341, 102 So. 689,
690 (1925) (dictum).25 See Georgian Co. v. Bloom, supra note 11.
16 See Hall v. Kimbark, 11 Fed. Cas. 234, No. 5938 (E.D. Mo. 1874).
17 RSTATrMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 25, comment a (1932).
Is People v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 202 Misc. 229, 115 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. City
Ct. Spec. Sess. 1952); Lovett v. Frederick Loeser & Co., 124 Misc. 81, 207
N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924).
19 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924).
2027 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921).
1956]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
nouncements do not meet the test of definiteness. People v. Gimbel
Bros. Inc.2 1 involved a prosecution under 'New York Penal Law
'Section 2147 which prohibits selling or offeriig for sale any property
on Sunday. The defendant department store maintained a telephone
answering service on Sunday to take orders from customers who were
responding to its Sunday newspaper advertisements. In holding that
the defendant had not violated the statute the court said that an ad-
vertisement does not constitute an offer of sale but is solely an invi-
tation to customers to make an offer to purchase. In instances,
however, where the advertiser has some control over his possible
liability the advertisement will be treated as an offer.
22
The instant case is unusual in that, as the dissenting opinion
points out, it relies for authority upon cases dealing with contests for
prizes and auction sales which are governed by their own particular
rules.2m An advertisement for the sale of merchandise should be
scrutinized closely to determine whether the advertiser intended to
assume legal liability thereby. The advertisement in the instant case
reads in part as follows:
TWO FOR ONE
............ For two weeks
BUY A NEW '54 FOR]) NOW
TRADE EVEN FOR A '55 FORD
Don't Wait-Buy a 1954 Ford now, when the 1955 models
come out we'll trade even for your '54. You pay only sales
tax and license fee. Your '55 Ford will be the same model,
same body style, accessory group, etc. A sure thing for you-
a gamble for us, but we'll take it. Hurry, though, this offer
good only for the remainder of September. 24
When plaintiff appeared at defendant's premises he offered no
indication that he was responding to this advertisement. The an-
nouncement was not mentioned by either party during the negotia-
tions and the purchase-sale contract contained a merger clause. In
holding that the parol evidence rule did not apply the court said that
"... the terms of this proviso limit it as the 'entire agreement per-
taining to this purchase,' which indeed was a complete contract within
itself; but this purchase-sale contract, complete within itself, was
nevertheless also the acceptance of an offer, creating another and a
21202 Misc. 229, 115 N.Y.S2d 857 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1952).
22 See Ford v. Ford Motor Ce, 181 App. Div. 28, 168 N.Y. Supp. 176 (3d
Dep't 1917) (per curiam) (defendant advertised that if it sold 300,000 cars
during a certain year all retail buyers of Fords for that year would be entitled
to a stated share of its profits); Payne v. Lantz Bros. & Co.. 166 N.Y. Supp.
844 (Buffalo City Ct. 1916), aff'd, 168 N.Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
185 App. Div. 904, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1094 (4th Dep't 1918).2 3 See Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75, 87 (La. Ct. App.
1955) (dissenting opinion).
24 Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. CL App. 1955).
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separate obligation." 2 Such an interpretation is placing an obvious
strain upon the exception to the parol evidence rule permitting the
admission of evidence to prove the existence of a collateral agreement.
The holding of the Court that this advertisement was an offer is
open to serious question. Defendant testified he would have offered
a much lower trade-in value for plaintiff's car had he known a 1954-55
deal was contemplated. Such accompanying circumstances as this
uncertainty as to price and the unusual nature of the announcement,
indicate the advertisement was merely an invitation to enter into
negotiation for an agreement.
The tenor of the majority opinion indicates an effort to discourage
extravagant and misleading advertising. The Court says: "'There
is entirely too much disregard of law and truth in the business, social,
and political world of to-day..... It is time to hold men to their
primary engagements to tell the truth and observe the law of common
honesty and fair dealing.' " 26
CONTRACTS-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-COMP, LAiN-K ALLEG-
ING BtEAcH oF CONTRAcr To CuRE Hna) SuF7IcIENT.--Plaintiff-
patient sought damages for breach of contract to cure. The complaint
alleged defendant-physician agreed to perform a minor operation on
plaintiff and to cure lIiim in one or tWo days, but that defendant
breached this agreement by puncturing :an abdominal organ which
necessitated further medical treatment and a consequent period of
convalescence. The trial court dismissed the action as being barred
by the malpractice statute of limitation. On appeal the Court of
Appeals held that a cause of action in contract was sufficiently stated.
Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E2d 330 (1955).
Although the legal liability of physicians to their patients has
generally been restricted to the area of torts,' the ntumber and voriety
of claims against physicians involving a breach'of' 46oitract are by no
means insignificait.2 The majority of jurisdictions-in' this country
hold that a physician and his patient are free to contract for a par-
ticular result and if that result be not attained, the patient may bring
25 Id. at 81.26 Id. at 82, where the court quotes Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co.,
106 Ohio St 328, 140 N.E. 118, 121 (1922).1 See, e.g., Pike v. H-onsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898) ; Patten
v. Wiggin, 51 Me.. 594 (1862); Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253 (1867);
Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. 111 (1858).
2 See Miller, The Contractual .Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953
WAsH. U.L.Q. 413, 416. See, e.g.-, Gill v. Schneider, 48 Colo. 382, 110 Pac. 62(1910); Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1874); Kolb v. Bergelin, 209 Wis. 547,
245 N.W. 583 (1932).
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